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Abstract 
The role that domestic and international financial conditions have in shaping developing 
countries’ governments’ debt structure is structurally estimated using data on individual 
bond issuance. The structural model, which employs financial and demographic conditions 
to achieve identification, is used to estimate three key characteristics of sovereign bonds: 
issue size, maturity and spread. To minimize sample selection concerns, in a first step, 
the issuance decision is studied by means of a probit model. Results show that 
better developed domestic financial markets and looser international financial conditions 
raise developing countries ability to tap international markets and, mainly through their effect 
on the spreads, are important determinants of the observed debt structure. We find 
evidence of complementarities between domestic financial deepening and financing 
conditions in global markets. 
 
Keywords: Sovereign debt, financial markets, global liquidity, structural analysis. 
JEL codes: F34, G12, C30. 
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1 Introduction 
How could the International Financial Architecture be reformed, to reduce the frequency 
and extent of financial crises? Commentators have pointed out that many of the last 
crises episodes in developing countries (EMEs and LDCs); have occurred after periods of 
accumulation of large quantities of debt on short maturities. Is it that these economies have a 
preference for short term debt, or market conditions do not allow them to borrow otherwise? 
Already in 1995, the World Bank recommended Asian countries to develop their domestic 
bond markets. The subsequent crises taught that developing economies actually needed 
deeper and more liquid bond markets. These would help to reduce both maturity and 
currency mismatches.1 
Along these lines, an empirical literature assessing the importance of domestic 
financial conditions has emerged. Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) or Jeanne 
and Guscina (2006) are excellent examples of this growing literature, that aims to link overall 
financial development with the sovereign debt structure, and financial crises. The present 
analysis follows that road. It sheds light on the link between financial markets, both 
domestic and international, sovereign debt structure and financial crises. Converse to 
previous studies, it does so by modelling the structural relation between the variables of 
interest using individual sovereign bond issuance data. We estimate a fully fledged supply and 
demand model for spreads and maturities. Identification of the model is achieved through 
the use of exclusion restrictions, based on demographics, domestic policies and international 
financial conditions. This allows addressing the effect of different financial factors in the 
specific characteristics of bond contracts. From the domestic side, special attention is paid 
to both the size and the level of activity of bond and stock markets. Regarding the 
international dimension, in addition to U.S. interest rates, an index reflecting international 
liquidity (investors’ wealth) is used. 
As a first step the issuance decision is analyzed by means of a probit model. This 
tells us what factors are behind the ability of developing economies to tap the markets. 
Additionally, the estimation is used to derive a control function that permits correcting biases 
when estimating the structural model which could arise due to sample selection problems. 
Eichengreen et al. (2001), and Min et al. (2004) show that non fundamental 
factors, “market sentiment” in their terminology, are very important determinants of when 
and how developing governments borrow. The current analysis, by accounting for financial 
conditions both at home and abroad, unmasks some factors behind that residual. The 
international financial situation is represented by including U.S. T-bill rates, an index 
that proxies global liquidity and a variable reflecting the growth rate of the previous index. 
These last two variables, whose construction is explained in detail in section 3, can be seen 
as directly related with investors’ risk attitude.2 An increase in the level of international 
liquidity, by increasing the money available in the hands of investors, reduces their (relative) 
risk aversion. To understand the role of domestic financial conditions different variables, 
obtained mostly from the Financial Structure Database, were used. Main focus was domestic 
bonds and stocks markets. The first was represented by the size of the public debt bond 
market relative to GDP. This same variable was used in Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 
                                                                          
1. See Broner et al. (2004) or Bussiere et al. (2006) for models featuring these mismatches. 
2. For a sovereign debt maturity model with risk-averse investors, see Broner et al. (2004). 
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(2004).3 It reflects the level of development of the domestic bond market for public debt. To 
represent stock markets two variables were included: the stock market capitalization over 
GDP, and the stock market turnover. The first measure gives an idea of the relative size of the 
stock market. The last variable represents the level of liquidity/activity on that market. To 
assess the robustness of the results, the analysis was also performed using two different data 
sets. One with data on financial conditions collected by La Porta et al. [LLSV (1999)], and 
other with data obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Results show that when spreads rise, governments prefer to issue shorter maturities. 
They also show that ampler global liquidity increases developing economies ability to 
tap the market and drives down the spreads. On the other hand, development of domestic 
financial markets appears to facilitate issuance in longer maturities and/or with lower spreads. 
This is evidence of a beneficial interaction between domestic financial deepening and access 
conditions on international financial markets. Some preliminary evidence is provided about the 
role of issuance clustering. It is shown that issuance clustering has an undoubtedly beneficial 
effect on the average maturity of domestic debt. 
The next section gives an overview of past findings, and summarizes the main 
contributions of the paper. Section 3 presents the econometric strategy, with a detailed 
explanation of the identification strategy. In section 4 the data used is briefly described. The 
main results and robustness checks are commented in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
Tables and data sources are presented in the Appendix. 
                                                                          
3. Another choice would be to include a variable measuring the bid-ask spread. Unluckily this kind of data is not 
available for many of the countries in our sample. Using bid-ask spreads also raises the issue of what bond to use 
[see Jeanneau and Perez Verdia (2006)]. 
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2 What do we know about the Sovereign Debt Structure? 
It has been long argued that developing economies borrowing strategy is at the basis of 
most of the last financial crises. The predominant view states that they over borrowed on a 
short term basis and/or in strong (foreign denominated) currencies. This inability to borrow 
on a long term basis using the domestic currency [“original sin” in the terminology of 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999)], leads to the so-called currency and maturity 
mismatches. These, when not adequately managed, have been a stepping stone into financial 
crises, and defaults. The empirical literature has tried to understand what factors are behind 
the “original sin”, and if it is de facto to be blamed on developing economies. Approaches 
have differed both in the econometric strategy and in the type of data used. Regarding 
the first aspect, econometric strategies range from standard OLS regressions in panels or 
cross-sections [see Min (2004) or Lane (2005)], to structural [EHM (2001)] or disequilibrium 
models [Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)]. On the other hand, while some papers have used 
macroeconomic aggregates, others have focused on individual issues. Macro data is useful to 
get an intuition about the big numbers of an economy. But, if the focus is on specific debt 
characteristics, it is necessary to use individual issues. However, this kind of data is scarce 
and incomplete. These may be the reasons why available analyses with micro data have 
pooled together public and private debt, in the form of both, bond or loans. 
The broad picture that arises from these contributions is that sound economic 
aggregates, monetary stability, and the political and legal environment are the fundamental 
factors explaining the observed debt structure. 
The Macro Oriented Empirical Literature 
Interest rates in the U.S. are often seen as an important factor conditioning capital flows 
to developing economies. Antzulatos (2000) shows that the ongoing process of portfolio 
diversification has reduced their effect. The “original sin” is analyzed in great detail in 
Hausmann and Panizza (2003). They find little evidence that factors like the level of 
development, institutional quality or monetary credibility are at the basis of it. The role 
of institutional factors, in determining the currency composition of the debt, is examined in 
Claessens et al. (2003). They find evidence of scale effects, countries with a larger base of 
domestic investors issue longer debt denominated in domestic currency. Evidence relating 
fixed exchange rates with larger foreign denominated debt markets is presented. Lane (2005) 
finds a significant relation between openness and debt levels. In Mody and Taylor (2004) a 
model of market disequilibrium is estimated. This allows recovering a supply and a demand 
function for capital.4 The results show that informational asymmetries are an important 
determinant of credit crunches. Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) shows that the 
slow development of bond markets in Asia is due to the combination of weak institutions, 
exchange rate volatility, and lack of competition in the banking industry. In line with this result, 
Boot and Thakov (1997) show that for a financial system to become mature the development 
of sources of credit different than bank lending is a must. The role of exchange rate volatility in 
generating large shares of short term debt is explored in Bussiere et al. (2006). Jeanne 
and Guscina (2006) present a new database on government debt in emerging countries. 
They report significant cross country differences, and attribute it especially to the different 
record of monetary stability. 
                                                                          
4. Their model is based in the early work by Maddala and Nelson (1974). See Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) for another 
application of this methodology to debt markets. 
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The evidence, summarized above, shows how economic, financial and political 
factors are important determinants of the debt structure and of the development 
of financial markets. However, this kind of analysis, due to its macroeconomic nature, is not 
helpful if the interest is in understanding the importance of the cost (spread) of the debt 
for the observed maturity. In Broner et al. (2004) investors holding bonds with long 
maturities are exposed to price risk, arising from the absence of liquid secondary markets. 
Therefore countries willing to issue long maturities must compensate investors for this risk, 
making long debt so expensive that sovereigns prefer shorter maturities, even at the cost 
of possibly facing sudden capital outflows.5 As Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), 
our paper supports this view. 
The Micro Oriented Empirical Literature 
When analyzing lending, there are three characteristics which are of capital importance: 
spread, maturity and size of the issue. There are a number of theoretical contributions 
which have managed to jointly analyze all three. However, empirical analyses are much harder 
to find, especially for developing economies. There are two main reasons for this. The first is 
a lack of data; markets for developing economies’ public debt were basically inexistent 
prior to the nineties. Second, such an analysis, among many other empirical complications, 
implies the estimation of a simultaneous equation model and requires dealing with sample 
selection problems. Eichengreen and Mody (1999) were the first to address concerns about 
sample selection. They estimated the determinants of bond and loan spreads, together with 
a probit to assess the factors determining bond issuance. Eichengreen, Hale and Mody 
[EHM hereafter (2001)], presented an econometric model where maturities and spreads 
were jointly analyzed, along with a probit to control for sample selection. In order to overcome 
the identification problem they assumed that, while the maturity affects the spread, the 
spread has no contemporaneous effect on the maturity. However, such strategy disregards 
cost considerations by the government when choosing the maturity. Their study made clear 
the importance of sound fundamentals, as they make the maturity of the debt longer, and 
relatively cheaper. However, it also showed that non fundamental factors, “market sentiment”, 
are a very important determinant of the observed borrowing patterns. Hale (2001) shows 
that borrowers with high political and economic risk will issue only “junk” bonds, while those 
countries with low levels of both risks will issue investment grade bonds. The rest are more 
likely demand loans from the banking sector. Gelos et al. (2004) presents an analysis on 
the determinants of market access. Default does not seem to provoke a strong punishment 
in terms of lost of market access. The quality of policies and institutions is an important 
determinant of the ability of sovereigns to tap the markets. Min et al. (2004) provides panel 
data analysis of debt spread determinants, however it disregards both endogeneity and 
sample selection problems. Jeanneau and Perez Verdia (2006) investigate the link between 
the development of the domestic government bond market in Mexico and the government’s 
debt composition. It shows how the development of a domestic bond market, has helped 
raising the maturity of the debt. 
This Paper 
The main contribution regards the econometric strategy. The simultaneous equations system 
we handle is expressed as a supply and demand model, for which we can find exclusion 
restrictions based on previous theoretical and empirical contributions. Comfortingly, results 
indicate that the identification mechanism works. 
                                                                          
5. Erce (2005) presents a similar mechanism, and shows how the interaction of both, illiquid markets and higher levels of 
short term debt, can give rise to unnecessary (panic based) crises. 
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Another relevant contribution of this paper is that, while the papers above jointly 
analyze loans and bonds, both private and public, we focus solely on public bonds. Bonds 
and loans are very different types of contracts. Private debt depends not only on 
macroeconomic characteristics, but also on specific firms’ characteristics. If we want to 
understand the markets for public bonds, it is therefore important to look at the factors 
determining their characteristics without pooling them with other types of debt or issuers, as 
this could give a distorted picture. Among the variables included in the study, our careful 
representation of financial conditions is the most innovative contribution. In this way we can 
test how domestic and international financial conditions affect the borrowing strategy of 
developing governments. In this way, the results shed light on how the specific contract 
characteristics are affected by financial factors. EHM (2001) argued that spreads and 
maturities reflect to a large extent market sentiment (risk aversion). The paper shows that 
financial conditions can explain part of this residual.6 
Finally, the paper addresses concerns about the possible biases that could arise if 
borrowers would strategically time their issuances. While clustering does not seem to bias 
the results obtained, it appears to have a positive effect on the maturity of the debt. 
                                                                          
6. In EHM (2001) international conditions were represented by interest rates in the U.S.A., and financial domestic factors 
by a measure of the domestic credit market. 
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3 Econometric Strategy 
The econometric analysis presented here, in addition to the sample selection concern, 
addresses two issues that were disregarded in previous studies. First, when estimating the 
maturity-spread relation, the issued amount variable is treated as an endogenous variable. 
Previous work has assumed that the issued amount was unrelated with other bond 
characteristics. Such an assumption, if false, could give rise to endogeneity problems. 
Second, a strategy to estimate the maturity-spread relation without relying on diagonalization 
is provided. The goal is to understand how spreads and maturity are jointly determined. 
The problem can be stated in terms of supply and demand equations, 
 
 demand Dit it M it itM S Xα ω= +Θ + ,   (1) 
 
supply S
it it S it itM S Xβ ω= +Θ + ,  (2) 
 supply demandit it itM M M= = ,  (3) 
 
where itS  and itM  are the spread and maturity of a bond issued by country i  at time t.  
These are the potentially endogenous variables of the system. itX  is a vector 
containing the exogenous variables.7 The errors are assumed to be well behaved, 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0D S D Sit it it itE E Eω ω ω ω= = = .  
The supply equation explains the preferred maturity of the investors. The demand 
equation determines the preferred maturity for the government. This makes it easier to find a 
set of exclusion restrictions in SΘ  and DΘ ,  needed to identify the structural parameters, 
and permits to relax the unpleasant assumption that spreads have no effect on observed 
maturities [see EHM (2001)]. 
Simple manipulation of the system above leads to 
 it it it itY BY X ε= +Γ +  (4) 
{1 } {1 }i N t T∈ ,... , ∈ ,... ,  where ( )it it itY M S′ =  contains the endogenous variables, 
itX  is a 1kx  vector containing the k  exogenous variables, B  is a 2 2x  non-singular 
matrix, Γ  is a 2xk  matrix, ),0(~ ΣNitε  are i i d. . .  This is the model to be estimated.8 
As mentioned before, along with the analysis of the characteristics of the bond, we 
study the issuance decision by means of a probit model. The dependent variable is access to 
financial markets in a given quarter. This quarterly indicator, itI , takes value one when country 
i  tapped the market on period t . The model, once that the issuance analysis is included is 
 1it it it it itY BY X if Iε= + Γ + =  
 it
I
itit XI υ+Ψ=*  (5) 
                                                                          
7. Enumeration of the explanatory variables included at each stage of the analysis is relegated to the next section. 
8. The relation between the coefficients in equations (1) to (3), and those in equation (4) is, 
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This is useful not only because it allows us to make an assessment of the factors 
determining the ability of developing economies to tap the financial markets, but also because 
it is a way to create the control function (the mills ratio) required to fix sample selection biases. 
As pointed out above, participation in the bond market has risen over time. This could imply 
that, OLS estimates of the relationship between specific country characteristics and spreads 
could be biased if these country characteristics not only affected the price of the debt, but 
also market access.9 
3.1 Political Risk 
Previous analyses have shown that political risk is an important determinant of both market 
access and borrowing strategies. Following Eichengreen and Mody (1999) and EHM (2001) 
an OLS estimation of the credit rating against a set of macroeconomic factors is performed, 
 
 rating ratingit it itrating Xθ ε= +  
 
The OLS-residual of this regression,
rating
itit
rating
it Xrating θε ˆ−= , can be understood as a 
measure of political risk.10 By construction, a higher rating residual is associated with higher 
political risk. This residual will be used as an additional regressor in subsequent steps. 
3.2 Issuance 
Once that ratingitε  has been obtained, the analysis moves to the estimation of the issuance 
decision [see equation (5)], using
I
it
rating
it X∈ε . From this analysis the inverse mills 
ratio,
)ˆ(
)ˆ(
I
it
I
it
it X
X
ΨΦ
Ψ= φλ , is obtained. This ratio will be used as a regressor in subsequent 
estimations. It will help us controlling for the sample selection concerns expressed 
before. It should be noted that the mills ratio collects, not only the factors that affect the 
issue decision of credit rationed governments, but also voluntary decisions not to access 
the market.11 As in EHM, to guarantee identification the probit model contains a variable only 
present at this stage of the estimation, the ratio of reserves to imports. 
3.3 Size 
As mentioned above, the issue size, itQ , can be simultaneously determined with the 
other terms of the contract. Endogeneity problems could arise from the direct introduction of 
the variable in the system.12 To avoid this problem the extended system is made triangular, 
and the size of the issue is replaced by the estimated value obtained from an OLS regression 
using a set of variables that previous studies found significant, 
                                                                          
9. This would be the case whenever 0≠),cov( itit υε . 
10. We used this indicator for consistency with EHM work.  
11. A natural extension would be to use disequilibrium models (see Maddala and Nelson, 1974) to understand if the 
selection arises due to credit rationing or to a voluntary decision. 
12. If the amount is endogenous, the system can be redefined as itititit EDXAZZ ++= , 
where )S,M,Q(Z itititit =  The estimation strategy amounts to triangularise the system. In terms of the matrix A, 
0 0 0
0
0
A a b
c d
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
This implies that, once a country can issue, the decision of how much debt to issue is not guided by the spreads or by 
the maturity. This is a quite restrictive statement, which may fit best countries who do not suffer from credit rationing.  
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 Q Qit Q it itQ Xθ ε= +  
where: ratingitε  and Qit itXλ ∈ , and Qititit XQ θˆˆ =  is the predicted size. 
The ratio of short term debt to total debt and GDP were selected as exclusion 
restrictions in this step. The first gives an idea of the possible need of funds in the short run. 
The fact that larger countries tend to have larger financial needs motivates the introduction 
of the second. 
3.4 Structural Model 
Finally, the analysis moves to jointly determining spread and maturity. On each period of 
time there are countries for which no debt was issued, while others tapped the market 
more than once. The estimation is done by considering each issue as an individual 
observation, and then taking care of time and spatial effects by including periods and region 
dummies. 
In order to estimate the simultaneous equations system, a two steps procedure was 
chosen.13 The way in which the procedure works is briefly summarized below. The first 
step amounts to estimate the reduced form parameters. We know that for the model (4)  a 
reduced form always exists: 
 
 it it itY X u= Π +  
 
where ratingitε , itQˆ  and it itXλ ∈ , 1( )I B −Π = Γ −  and 1( )it itu I Bε −= − .   
This allows retrieving itit XY Π= ˆˆ  where Πˆ  is the OLS estimates of Π.  The next 
step is to replace the endogenous variables by their first step estimate, 
 
 itititit XYBY η+Γ+= ˆ  (6) 
 
where ititit BX)ˆ( Π−Π+= εη . 
MODEL IDENTIFICATION 
Identification of the system requires defining two sets of instruments. The one used to identify 
the effect of the maturity on the spread equation requires variables which directly affect the 
preferred maturity of the government, but only affect the preferred maturity of the investors 
through the spread. Two candidates are presented, pension reforms and the demographic 
structure. During the last decade, some developing economies financed reforms in their 
pension systems by issuing sovereign bonds.14 The maturity of these bonds could be affected 
by the interest of the governments to match durations. An indicator which takes value one on 
debt issued up to three years after the reform was constructed. Given the high cost of these 
reforms, it makes sense to assume that they were financed over a number of years after the 
                                                                          
13. Also a three steps procedure was applied, yielding similar results. 
14. We focus in reforms that implied a change from a pay as you go system to one with individual accounts. These 
changes let the governments with the need of financing the retirement benefits of existing pensioners, and the ones 
to come in the near future, during the transition process. 
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implementation. The next group of instruments is related with the demographic distribution in 
the population. Two variables reflecting the proportion of the population between 35 and 55, 
and above 55 were included. Governments, with a higher proportion of older people, can 
have political incentives to issue longer debt. This is a political economy argumentation, in 
order to guarantee the voting of the elder a government may have an incentive to issue longer 
debt to be repaid by future generations.15 
Next, we need to define the identification restrictions on the supply equation, 
required to identify the effect of the spread on the maturity. Three different types of variables 
were included. They can be summarized as variables affecting investors’ wealth, political risk, 
and variables affecting investors outside option. Regarding the last, the 10 years U.S. T-bill 
rate was used. This is a standard variable in spread analyses [see Eichengreen and 
Mody (1999) or Min et al. (2004)]. As for the first, the index of international liquidity mentioned 
above, which is defined in more detail in the next section, was chosen. It reflects the level of 
wealth available for international investors. Theoretically, increases in this variable should 
make investors less concerned about liquidity issues, and hence require a lower premium.  
Finally the residual of the rating regression was used as a measure of political risk. As the 
number of exclusion restrictions is larger than that of endogenous variables, the system can 
be overidentified. Sargan tests for overidentifying restrictions were performed for a variety of 
specifications. The specific results are presented in the next section. The null hypothesis was 
never rejected, suggesting that the model was correctly identified. 
                                                                          
15. See Perotti and Alesina (1997), Persson et al. (2005) or Bassetto and Sargent (2005) for models of political economy 
yielding the argument presented here. 
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4 Data 
We obtained data on bond characteristics from Bondware (Dealogic). It included data on 
maturity, spread, credit rating, issued amount and currency denomination. We had 
around 2000 observations of public bonds issued by developing economies from 1990 
to 2005. A list of countries, for which the analysis was performed, is contained in the 
Appendix. To show that the effects obtained were not driven by an ad-hoc choice of 
the explanatory variables the variables included in each part of the analysis are, as long as 
available, as in EHM (2001). 
The macroeconomic variables reflecting both domestic and international conditions 
were obtained mostly from the International Financial Statistics and the World Development 
Indicators. T-bill rates were obtained from Datastream. Data on stock markets and bond 
markets was obtained from the Financial Structure Database. Exchange rates were obtained 
from Global Finance Data. Data on pension systems’ reform was obtained from the U.S. 
Social Security Administration, which collects data from pensions’ reforms worldwide.16 Data 
coming from both the World Bank and the Paris Club was used to construct an indicator of 
debt rescheduling process, which takes value one when on the specific year in which a 
country went through a debt rearrangement. The data about the demographic structure was 
obtained form the World Development Indicators. Two variables were used. One, which 
we labelled as “old”, reflects the proportion of the population that is above 55. The other, 
under the name “adults” collects the proportion of the population with aged between 35 
and 55. A full source description can be found in the Appendix. 
Global Liquidity 
“International” liquidity is hard to measure. More developed countries have higher liquidity 
ratios as measured by monetary aggregates (M1, M2, etc.) to GDP than less developed 
countries. Part of the change in liquidity measures for emerging economies could thus simply 
indicate that they are becoming financially more sophisticated. It is hence difficult to 
aggregate measures over all countries in the world. Furthermore, strictly speaking, one would 
like to have only “narrow” money, but narrow money is often not available. However, in 
developing countries the monetary base is backed by international reserves. Hence, 
developments in foreign reserves can be used as a proxy for developments in narrow money. 
Therefore, the international availability of funds is proxied by an index with base in 1990, that 
adds together country by country data about the ratio of M2 (or reserves when M2 was not 
available) to GDP. Data for this index was obtained from IFS.17 
                                                                          
16. The data used is available at: http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/ 
17. Measuring world liquidity using this kind of indices is common practice in Investment Banking. See European 
Investment Bank (September, 2005) or IXIS (July, 2005). 
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Chart 1: Global Liquidity 
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Source: Dealogic and author’s calculations. 
 
As shown in Chart 1, the process of yield compression that started with the new 
century has come hand in hand with large increases in global liquidity. In the chart, the 
variable liquidity growth reflects the percent change in the index in a period by period basis. 
The critical role that international reserves play in the expansion —and potential contraction— 
of global liquidity has received much attention recently. Arista and Griffith-Jones (2006) nicely 
explains the way in which increased U.S. dollar holdings at developing economies’ Central 
Banks, can give rise to increased liquidity back in the United States, as they are repatriated in 
exchange for U.S. Treasuries. 
In order to minimize endogeneity issues, lagged values of all variables were used in 
the estimation procedure. Dummy variables to control for regional and time effects were 
constructed. Period dummies were constructed reflecting four different time periods. One 
accounts for issues until the Mexican crisis (1994), the next covers the period between 
the Mexican and the Asian crises (1995-1996), the next accounts for period between the 
Asian and the Russian crises (1997-1999), and the last runs from 2000 until 2005. To control 
for regional effects dummies were constructed reflecting the membership to the following 
regions: Latin America, East Europe, Asian Tigers, New Giants (China and India), Middle East 
and Africa. 
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5 Results 
In this section, the main results of the different parts of the analysis are reported step by step. 
The main focus is on the effect of financial conditions, the identification strategy, and on 
results that contrast with previous findings. Tables containing the estimation results and the 
specification tests can be found in the Appendix. 
5.1 Determinants of Credit Rating 
In for this part of the analysis we used the Standard and Poors definition of 
credit rating. The Appendix contains a table explaining the way in which the ratings 
were represented. By construction, higher values on the variable are associated with 
a worse rating. Results are similar to those in EHM, and are summarized in Table 1 below.18 
 
Table 1: Regression for the Credit Rating 
 
Variables
Debt reschduled las period (dummy) 1.075**
Reserves over gdp -9.649**
Total external detb over gdp 3.825**
Exports over gdp -0.027**
Inflation 0.0007**
GDP growth -1.387**
Latin american dummy 1.06**
East European Dummy -0.617**
Tigers 1.024**
Orient 1.83**
Africa 0.109
constant 10.918**
No. of observations 1894
Adjusted R- squared 0.422  
 
Our estimates show that previous debt rescheduling, higher total external debt over 
GDP and higher inflation have a negative impact on the rating. On the other hand higher 
reserves over GDP, exports over GDP or GDP growth are associated with improving ratings. 
5.2 The Issuance Decision 
The analysis of the probability of issuance is performed by adding to the benchmark EHM 
probit specification, first the variables reflecting international availability of funds, then 
the ones representing the domestic financial conditions, and finally all together. Additionally, 
most of the regressions include dummies to collect the possible effects that crises would 
have. They take a value one on the specific quarter in which commentators claim the crises 
to have started and on the following three quarters. The results are reported in tables A1 
and A2 in the Appendix. 
                                                                          
18. This is a comforting result because, while we used the S&P rating, EHM used data from Institutional Investors. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO N.º 0809 
The first two columns in table A1 collect the results for the model that replicates the 
analysis in EHM; in the last column the results when the measures of international liquidity 
were included are presented. Results are similar to those in previous studies. Larger size, as 
proxied by a larger GDP, lower political risk, and higher ratios of reserves to imports increase 
the probability of issuance. However, the sign of the last one changed when domestic 
financial variables were added to the regression. Previous debt rescheduling, higher external 
debt, and a lower debt service to exports ratio seem to reduce the probability of a country 
issuing debt.  Increases in the growth of international liquidity, as expected, raise the 
probability of issuance. Regarding the crises dummies, although the significance was not 
always especially high, there are some indications, consistent with the contagion stories 
found elsewhere, that the Mexican and the Russian crises affected the probability of 
observing developing economies tapping the financial markets at a global level. It is 
interesting to note that the international liquidity appears to be a more important determinant 
of issuance than the 10 year U.S. T-bill. As long as those two variables can be seen as 
reflecting quantity and price of the international funds, this result points to the fact that the 
quantity of funds available is more important for issuance than their cost (credit rationing). 
The next set of results, when domestic financial conditions are taken into account is 
collected in table A2. First column adds to the EHM benchmark the selected variables. 
In the second column the international liquidity variables are added.19 The last column 
collects the results of the estimation that was used for computing the correction for the 
sample selection problem.20 There are several consistent findings. First, a larger stock market 
capitalization is associated with a lower probability of issuance. A possible interpretation is 
that public and private agents are in competition for international funds. The larger stock 
market is the harder for the government to place its bonds.21 Second, if financial markets are 
liquid, as reflected by the turnover variable, it is easier for investors to hedge against risks and 
this makes it easier for the governments to place their debt in the market. However, this is a 
non linear relation, and for large levels of turnover the effect becomes negative. The non linear 
effect of stock market turnover on the issuance probability is represented in Chart 2. Finally, 
the larger the market capitalization of the public bond market, the easier that a government 
will issue debt. One should be cautious in giving an interpretation to this result. This may imply 
that larger bond markets make it easier to issue additional debt, but it can also reflect the fact 
that countries which issued large quantities of sovereign debt in the past are more likely to do 
it in the present. As can be seen in Chart 3, changes in the international liquidity index have a 
positive effect on the issuance probability. It should be noted, however, that the significance 
of the variables reflecting international liquidity was greatly reduced when the estimation 
included the measure about the size of the public bond market. 
5.3 Issue Size Determinants 
All the variables included in the analysis are based in previous analyses.22 Most of those 
studies disregarded the role of financial conditions. An exception is Mody and Taylor 
(2004).The results are summarized in table A3. There is strong evidence of a size effect, larger 
economies borrow larger amounts. The interest rate for the 10 years T-bill is negatively 
associated with the size of the issue. As before, when measures of international liquidity are 
                                                                          
19. Note that the amount of observations falls greatly when data about public bond market is used. To maximize the 
number of observations available for the next step we decided not to include this variable when obtaining the Mills ratio. 
20. The analysis was also performed by adding one variable at a time with identical results. 
21. This is of course on of the many explanations that one can think of. Other would be that as the stock markets 
develop the Government faces less often the need of raising funds directly as firms can do it through the stock 
exchange. 
22. See Antzulatos (2000), Mody and Taylor (2004), Lane (2004), Hale (2001), or Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). 
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introduced the significance of this variable drops (see column 2). As one would expect, when 
the level of wealth in the hands of international investors rises, their appetite for developing 
sovereign bonds follows suit, and with it the size of the observed issues. This can be seen 
also in the significance of the dummy reflecting issues since 2000 period on which the interest 
of investors for developing countries’ debt has grown together with the level of international 
liquidity (see chart 1). Dummies reflecting the currency denomination of the bond were 
introduced. Issues in U.S. dollars tend to be significantly larger, while issues denominated in 
domestic currency are smaller. This can be one of the factors explaining the recurrent use of 
hard currency issuance by developing countries. There is a group of explanatory variables 
whose effect changes when variables reflecting domestic financial conditions are introduced. 
This can be seen when comparing the coefficients in columns 1 and 2 with those in columns 
3 and 4. The ratio of short term debt to total debt, the ratio of debt service to exports, the 
sample selection control, and the political risk indicator, which in the absence of domestic 
financial variables had a negative and significant sign, turn positive or insignificant when the 
financial variables are added. The first two can be understood of variables determining 
financial needs, but can also represent liquidity problems. Once we control for financial 
conditions in a rigorous way, they are collecting the fact that more resources may be needed 
and hence the positive effect on the amount issued. The ratio of exports to GDP and the 
dummy reflecting previous debt rescheduling have a negative coefficient. 
Domestic financial conditions have a significant effect on the amount of debt. As the 
turnover in the stock market increases, i.e., as the liquidity in domestic financial markets 
rises, the size of the issues becomes smaller. This result can be related to the positive effect 
of turnover on issuance. When financial markets are more liquid, governments can tap the 
market more often and do so in smaller amounts. Additionally, we found a non-linear effect 
from the relative size of the public bond market on the size of the issues. Increasing public 
bond markets seem to be associated with larger issues, however as the size keeps growing 
this effect becomes negative. When public bond markets become more developed issuance 
becomes easier, and as before this may give an incentive to governments to launch smaller 
issues at a time.  
5.4 Determinants of the Maturity and Spread 
As with the issuance decision, we performed the joint analysis of spreads and maturities in 
steps, adding to the benchmark specification [EHM (2001)] the variables reflecting 
financial conditions. Given that EHM (2001) analysis is closest to this, it seems the best way 
to proceed to stick to their specification as much as possible. Again, following EHM, a first 
step was to test for the existence of a non linear relation of maturities and spreads with the 
credit rating.23 Given the results, as in previous studies, we performed the analysis by 
separating the observations in two categories, investment grade and non-investment grade 
bonds.24 
The results for the maturity are presented in table A4, and those for the spread in 
Table 6. The first column from both tables reproduces the analysis in EHM, but introducing 
the variables aimed at identifying the system. The next columns, [4.2] and [4.2], report the 
results when controlling for the endogeneity of the amount issued. The main difference is 
                                                                          
23. A simple OLS regression shows that, 
2 20 456 0 026 ( ) 0 11it it itM rating rating R= . ∗ − . ∗ . = .  
Standard errors are 0.163 and 0.008 respectively.  Hale (2001) makes a related point. 
24. Unluckily the number of observations with an investment grade rating was too small to perform the structural 
analysis. Here we present only the analysis for the non-investment grade bonds. 
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the significance of the parameter associated with the effect of the spread once that 
endogeneity is accounted for. The rest of the results are (as expected) similar to those in 
previous studies. Next two columns, [4.3], [4.4], [5.3], and [5.4], explore the effect that 
domestic factors have in the determination on the spread and maturity of the bonds. 
ROBUSTNESS 
To asses the robustness of these results we decided to construct two alternative measures 
representing the domestic financial conditions. The first one was constructed by obtaining the 
first principal component of data on the total value of the stocks traded and the turnover ratio, 
coming from the World Development Indicators. The second measure was constructed 
using two measures of financial market efficiency constructed by La Porta et al. [LLSV (1998)]. 
The variables were the ratio of turnover to net interest margin and the ratio of turnover to 
overhead costs. For both data sets, one factor was enough to collect most of the 
information available.25 The results of the analysis are reported in Columns 5 and 6 from 
tables A4 and A5. The eigen values and factor loadings for both factors are presented 
in Tables A7 and A8 in the appendix. 
IDENTIFICATION 
Comfortingly the variables proposed to identify the system were significant.  This is always 
true for the variable representing the proportion of the population above 55. For many of 
the different specifications Sargan tests for overidentifying restrictions were performed. The 
results for the test were almost always positive, in the sense that the system was correctly 
identified. Therefore, the structural parameters obtained are to be trusted. Table A9 in the 
Appendix summarizes the results of the tests, and explains how they were performed. 
Maturity 
There is evidence of a negative relation between the spread and the maturity. This result is on 
line with the theoretical insights presented in Broner et al. (2004) and Erce (2005). When the 
cost of the debt, as represented by the spread, rises, governments have an incentive to issue 
shorter maturities. 
Our results do not show any direct relation between the observed maturity of 
the debt and the indicators of domestic financial development. Other factors affecting the 
maturity are previous debt rescheduling and (surprisingly) the growth rate of GDP. Both have 
a negative influence on the maturity of the issued bond. On the other hand, as the ratio of 
reserves to short term debt increases, the maturity also raises. In the absence of liquidity 
needs in the short run, governments prefer to issue debt in longer maturities. Also the size of 
the issue affects positively the maturity of the bond. In general, issues in U.S. dollar have a 
larger maturity than the rest. Finally, we summarize the results for the identification variables. 
While the pension system reform variables do not seem to affect the maturity, the results 
show a positive and highly significant relation between the proportion of population 
above 55 and the maturity of the issued bonds. The first result may be due to the fact that 
most of the bonds available for this part of the analysis were denominated in foreign 
currencies and issued in international markets, while pensions’ reform tended to be financed 
with domestic debt. 
 
                                                                          
25. The rule to select the number of factors was the standard one. Add those factors with an eigen value well 
above one. 
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Spread 
Overall results point to a significant effect of domestic financial factors. More developed, in the 
sense of larger and/or more liquid domestic financial markets, drive down the observed 
spread, and this leads governments to issue larger maturities. This can be seen in columns 3 
to 6 from Table A5. The coefficients for the value and squared value of the size of the public 
bond market, the size of the stock market, and those for the factors obtained from both WDI 
and LLSV data have a highly significant and negative coefficient. 
Also the international liquidity index has a consistent negative effect on the spreads. 
Wealthier investors have an increased appetite for developing countries debt, and this is 
reflected in the premium they ask for, which is reduced. On the other hand, higher external 
debt, higher political risk, lower GDP growth, and a higher ratio of reserves to GDP, lead 
investors to ask for a higher yield, and thereby increase the observed spread. As in EHM a 
negative relation of both the 10 years U.S. T-bill and the mills ratio with the spreads was 
found. U.S. dollar denominated issues are not only associated with larger maturities, but also 
with larger spreads. 
The results have an important message, they point to a synergy between domestic 
financial factors and the conditions under which developing economies can borrow in 
international markets. Better developed domestic markets help improving financing conditions 
abroad. In addition, through the effect that the spread has on the preferred maturity of the 
government, they lead to larger maturities. 
5.5 Simultaneous Issuance: the case for being strategic 
Throughout the paper we have tried to overcome a variety of sources of endogeneity by using 
both lags and exclusion restrictions. In this section we explore another possible 
miss-specification of the model, issuance clustering. 
Table 2 below presents the quarterly average maximum maturity observed for two 
groups. One containing those observations for which no other issue was observed that 
quarter (unique). The other contains the maximum maturity in periods when more than one 
bond was issued (clustered). It shows that “simultaneous” issuance is more common in 
domestic markets, while it is accompanied by a longer range of maturities in international 
markets. When developing economies cluster issuance in determined periods of time the 
same fundamentals need to explain a variety of maturities and spreads. 
Table 2: Issuance Clustering in Domestic and Foreign Markets 
 
Maximum maturity Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
% of cases 
domestic issue 
unique 
clustered 
foreign issue 
unique 
clustered 
8.94 
9.21 
      9.18 
11.73 
6.63 
6.22 
6.65 
7.70 
31 
69 
62 
38 
 
It sounds reasonable that, by offering a more diverse spectrum of assets, investors 
are better able to diversify their portfolio, which could make their willingness to hold larger 
maturities increase and/or reduce the premium to be paid. Not accounting for this could lead 
to biased estimates. The importance of issuance clustering for the observed debt structure, 
and the concerns about estimation biases are analyzed below. 
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How far into the future? The case for strategic issuance 
As just argued the scope of this section is twofold. On the one hand, it will allow us to check if 
the results obtained in the previous section are robust. On the other hand, by assessing the 
effects of issuing a variety of bonds in specific periods on the terms of the same, we are 
investigating if there is a case for developing economies to strategically concentrate debt 
issuance in specific periods. We pursued the following strategy. For every period for every 
country we chose the bond with the largest maturity. In this way for each country at each 
point in time there is at most one bond. Additionally to control for the effect that offering a 
variety of bonds can have, an indicator (a variety dummy) was constructed which takes 
a value one when in that specific period a country issued more than one bond. As argued 
above, significance of this coefficient may be associated with effects arising from allowing 
investors to diversify their portfolio. The results for a variety of specifications are presented in 
table A6. Remarkably the results are basically identical to those obtained before. This 
indicates that previous estimates did not suffer from biases arising form simultaneous 
issuance. As before, more developed domestic financial markets reduce the spread to be 
paid, and this raises the observed maximum maturity. Additionally, we find a significant effect 
of the variety dummy on the maximum maturity observed. When countries offer the market a 
variety of bonds they are able to place bonds with larger maturities. 
These are important results. First, they show that countries can benefit from 
timing the issuances and offering a variety of alternatives. Second, this reinforces the 
argument on the benefits of developing the domestic financial markets. Results show how 
they help to enlarge the maximum maturity for which bonds can be issued. 
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6 Conclusion 
This paper adds to a large list of studies trying to understand what factors drive the borrowing 
strategy followed by developing economies. The paper presents an estimation strategy which 
allows identification of the structural parameters in a model of the simultaneous determination 
of maturities and spreads. The model was estimated using data on individual bond issuance 
by sovereign governments and was used to asses the impact of financial development on the 
terms of sovereign debt contracts. Results regarding the effect of the usual macroeconomic 
aggregate variables are in line with previous studies. 
As one would expect, estimates point to a significant effect of both domestic and 
international conditions. This effect affects both the timing and the form of sovereign 
borrowing. When the level of liquidity international markets is high, Governments find it easier 
to tap the market, and can do so with better conditions. On the other hand, better functioning 
domestic financial markets, both for stocks and for bonds, seem to affect the conditions that 
investors impose on international bonded debt. Results suggest that well developed domestic 
bond markets and more liquid financial markets help reducing spreads, and this creates 
incentives for issuing bonds with longer maturities. 
To address concerns about miss-specification, we analyzed the effect of issuance 
clustering. Reassuringly, this effect, though significant, does not seem to be driving the rest of 
the results. The results give a significant role to issuance clustering. When a variety of bonds 
is offered to investors, governments seem to be able to issue debt on larger maturities. 
Developing economies should try to take advantage from this by strategically clustering their 
debt issuance. These results reinforce the argument in favor of developing domestic financial 
markets as a way to reduce the depth of financial crises. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1: Result for the Issuance Probit Analysis. EHM and International 
Liquidity 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Rating residual -0.041** -0.043** -0.043**
10 years U.S. T-Bill rate -0.296 -0.432 -0.337
U.S. Treasury Yield Curve (10y-1y) 0.09 0.043 0.09
External debt to GDP -0.278 -0.301 -0.298
Debt service to exports ratio 0.011** 0.012** 0.012**
Debt rescheduled last year (dummy) -0.49** -0.483** -0.482**
Exports over GDP -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
Reserves to imports ratio 0.311** 0.288* 0.307*
Reserves to short term debt ratio -0.0001 0.0001 0.00002
GDP (/e-11) 0.207** 0.206** 0.207**
Domestic credit (/e-8) -0.143** -0.145** -0.145**
Level of international liquidity - - -0.002
Growth on international liquidity - - 3.164**
Latin America 0.705** 0.705** 0.707**
East Europe 1.3** 1.295** 1.301**
Four Asian Tigers 0.723** 0.731** 0.733**
Orient 0.714** 0.712** 0.714**
Africa 0.207 0.178 0.189
Before Mexican crises -0.455** -0.543** -0.681**
Mexican to Asian crises -0.199* -0.217 -0.24
New century 0.091 -0.016 0.047
Mexican crisis - -0.33* -0.347*
Asian crisis - -0.158 -0.116
Russian crisis - -0.385** -0.146
Argentinian crisis - -0.121 -0.135
Constant -0.985* -0.592 -0.401
No. observations 1766 1766 1766
Pseudo R-squared 0.155 0.16 0.162
Predicted probability of issuance 0.3192 0.3913 0.3195
Observed probability 0.321 0.321 0.321
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Chart 2: Issuance Probability and Stock Market Turnover 
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Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
Chart 3: Issuance Probability and International Liquidity 
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Table A2: Result for the Issuance Probit Analysis. Domestic Financial 
Conditions 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) Mills 
Rating residual -0.027 -0.036 -0.041 -0.074**
10 years U.S. T-bill rate -0.811** -1.138** -0.771 -0.273
U.S. Treasury yield curve (10y-1y) 0.125 0.041 0.03 0.133*
External debt to GDP -1.719** -1.942** -1.912** -0.172
Debt service to exports ratio -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 0.009**
Debt rescheduled last year (dummy) -0.296* -0.276 -0.25 -0.47**
Reserves to imports ratio -0.393 -0.466* -0.509* 0.296*
Reserves to short term debt ratio -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004**
Exports over GDP -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003
GDP (/e-11) 0.944** 0.086** 0.008** 0.199**
Domestic credit (/e-8) 0.0104 0.003 -0.004 -0.166**
Level of international liquidity - - 0.006 -0.0001
Growth on international liquidity - - 2.856 3.541**
Capitalization public bond market over GDP 1.946** 1.967** 1.971** -
Stock Market capitalization over GDP -0.015** -0.016** -0.016** -0.01**
Stock market turnover 0.775** 0.802** 0.781** 0.747**
Squared stock market turnover -0.178* -0.183* -0.177* -0.169**
Latin America 1.875** 1.893** 1.874** 1.413**
East Europe 1.522** 1.508** 1.451** 1.523**
Four Asian Tigers 1.781** 1.808** 1.77** 1.32**
Orient 2.256** 2.282** 2.277** 1.171**
Africa 1.787** 1.723** 1.737** 2.5**
Before Mexican crises -0.716** -0.951** -0.747** -0.562**
Mexican to Asian crises -0.099 -0.179 -0.104 -0.013
New century 0.037 -0.144 -0.163 0.165
Mexican crisis - -0.535** -0.441* -0.305
Asian crisis - -0.301 -0.258 0.003
Russian crisis - -0.779** -0.58* -0.065
Argentinian crisis - -0.375** -0.28 -0.232*
Constant 0.857 1.858* 0.175 -1.659
No. observations 767 767 767 1445
Pseudo R-squared 0.25 0.265 0.269 0.185
Predicted probability of issuance 0.464 0.465 0.465 0.37
Observed probability 0.467 0.467 0.467 0.372
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Table A3: Analysis of the Issued Amount 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
GDP(e-10) 0.028 0.027 0.017 0.022
(8.97)** (8.58)** (4.35)** (4.64)**
Short term debt over total debt -0.018 -0.020 0.009 0.010
(5.89)** (6.40)** (1.91)* (2.24)**
Debt service over exports -0.017 -0.016 -0.003 0.001
(7.39)** (7.05)** (0.91) (0.25)
Exports over GDP 0.002 0.003 -0.010 -0.008
(0.72) (1.21) (4.21)** (3.11)**
10 years U.S. T-bill rate -0.526 -0.118 -0.895 -0.832
(2.40)** (0.46) (4.18)** (3.42)**
Debt rescheduled last period -0.046 -0.068 -0.286 -0.420
(0.36) (0.53) (2.23)* (2.93)**
Reserves to short term debt ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.069 -0.060
(0.58) (0.61) (2.73)** (2.36)**
Inv. Mills Ratio -0.379 -0.310 0.391 0.929
(2.07)** (1.53) (1.47) (2.47)**
Rating residual -0.076 -0.087 0.023 0.000
(4.19)** (4.67)** (1.09) (0.02)
 Level of international liquidity 0.009 0.005
(3.10)** (1.72)*
Growth in international liquidity -0.184 1,913
(0.13) (1.43)
SMTO -0.445 -0.303
(4.27)** (2.44)**
SMC 0.002 -0.002
(0.87) (0.46)
PBMC 2,588 2,486
(2.48)** (2.38)**
Squared PBMC -2,988 -3,260
(1.58)* (1.72)*
Four Asian Tigers 0.188 0.138 -1,552 -1,105
(0.67) (0.49) (4.09)** (2.49)*
East Europe 0.179 0.196 -0.909 -0.370
(0.61) (0.66) (2.34)* (0.79)
Latin America 0.773 0.808 -0.940 -0.432
(2.69)** (2.76)** (2.51)* (0.96)
Orient 1,132 1,170 -0.438 -0.009
(3.70)** (3.76)** (1.23) (0.02)
Africa 1,149 1,208 -1,847 -0.860
(2.98)** (3.13)** (2.74)** (1.05)
Before Mexico -0.438 -0.195 -0.368 -0.336
(2.53)** (1.01) (2.21)** (1.78)*
New century 0.490 0.406 0.531 0.534
(5.46)** (4.30)** (5.67)** (5.58)**
Mexico-Asia -0.123 -0.019 -0.146 -0.103
(0.89) (0.13) (1.24) (0.82)
Domestic currency -1,770 -1,760 -0.983 -0.965
(12.12)** (11.96)** (7.13)** (6.94)**
USD 0.239 0.232 0.282 0.287
(2.06)** (2.01)** (2.85)** (2.92)**
Non-investment grade -0.470 -0.452 0.001 -0.007
(5.36)** (5.13)** (0.01) (0.07)
Constant 6,770 4,562 7,673 5,529
(12.41)** (5.10)** (11.45)** (4.54)**
No. of observations 1717 1717 1215 1215
Adj. R-squared 0.503 0.51 0.53 0.54
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.
Table A4: Structural Model Results – Maturity. 
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SMC: Stock market capitalization over GDP
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Table A5: Structural Model Results – Spreads 
Variables [5.1] [5.2] [5.3] [5.4] [5.5] [5.6]
Maturity -9.25 -9.66 -6.06 -7.03 -15.69 -8.73
DC to GDP 43,84** 44,52** 42,44** 47,21** 73,92** 20.34
Debt rescheduled -1.76 1.81 3.67 1.21 -9.44 29.91
Inflation 0.05 0.058 0.05 0.049 0.046 0.048
U.S. T-bill YC -13.58 -17.88 -11.8 -15.49 -33,28* -20.34
ED to GDP 250,95** 251,07** 276,33** 316,52** 339,79** 419,99**
GDP growth -306,5** -326,07** -290,61** -292,31** -326,21** -296,6**
DS to X 1,63** 1,21* 1.64** 1,47** 0.21 -0.1
RES to ST debt -14.23 -18.37 -26.68** -16.67 -15.37 -14.36
Log amount 30.52 - - - - -
Est. amount - 11.05 -13.76 55.62 37.3 74.65
Inv. Mills Ratio 104,48** 71,3* 99,34** 114,62** 9.66 -16.04
PBMC - - 624,38* - - -
Squared of PBMC - - -1119,8** - - -
SMTO - - - 27.41 - -
SMC - - - -1.41* - -
Financial factor WDI - - - - -100,3** -
Financial factor LLSV - - - - - -238,1**
Rating residual 23,51** 22,51** 21,65** 18,74** 23,04** 18,43*
10-y US T-bill rate -527,3** -513,02** -541,15** -483,05** -463,18** -450,78**
International liquidity -2,92** -2,76** -2,67** -3.06** -2.45 -3.51**
Liquidity growth -160.5 -179.04 -105.04 -46.73 -404.34 -362.2
Latin America 140,02** 147,76** 193,04* -38.38 84.16 140,1**
East Europe 140,5* 170,96** 114.48 -80.05 59.13 117.9
Orient 62.76 63.83 63.17 -148.73 56.95 78.1
Four Asian Tigers -63.6 -55.42 -116.1 -219.15 -206.52 -24.08
Before Mexico -126,9** -125,9* -128,74** -133,64** -79.29 -96,04*
Mexico-Asia -26.8 -23.44 -19.88 -20.71 -12.39 -15.11
New century 20.88 29.79 36.18 13.77 19.27 13.92
USD 93,28** 104,05** 98,98** 79,98** 104,26** 81,42**
EUR 44,46* 47,49*** 53,35** 40.68 22.44 30.48
constant 1253,3** 1357,34** 1431,9** 1208,8** 1122,4** 948**
No. of observations 292 292 292 292 254 292
R- squared 0.53 0.52 0.59 0.576 0.35 0.55  
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Table A6: Structural Analysis of the Maximum Maturity 
Table A6.1: Maturity 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Spread -0,022** -0,025** -0,021** -0,025**
DC toGDP 1.28 1.35 0.58 0.645
Debt rescheduled -3,85** -3,94** -4,18** -2.96
Inflation 0.0005 0.001 0.001 0.001
Variety dummy - 3,48** 3,4** 3,48**
U.S. T-bill YC -1.37 -1.42 -1.42 -1,67*
ED to GDP 15.02 15,96* 12.23 20,19*
GDP growth -12,57** -13,16** -12,28** -13,18**
DS to X 0.014 -0.009 -0.02 -0.03
RES to ST debt 1,46** 1,39** 1,29* 1,3*
Estimated amount 8,47** 8,07** 7,04** 9,66**
Inv. Mills Ratio -0.91 -0.9 -0.96 -3.12
PBMC - - 6.16 -
FFLLSV - - - -7.86
Proportion of old 1,4** 1,25** 1,17** 1,06**
Proportion of adults -1.07 -0.77 -0.78 -1.07
Latin America 1.95 2.65 5.26 2.86
East Europe -2.73 -2.63 0.265 -1.04
Orient -0.59 -1.07 1.52 0.6
Four AsianTigers -2.73 -2.17 0.86 -1.58
Before Mexico -0.72 -0.16 -0.484 0.94
Mexico-Asia -0.03 0.39 0.073 0.802
New century -3.45 -2.79 -2.46 -3.23
USD 3,52** 3,4** 3,37** 2,97*
EUR -1.15 -1.41 -1.41 -1.6
Constant 18.16 2.11 6.8 10.41
No. of observations 157 157 157 157
R- squared 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.35  
PBMC: Public Bond Market Capitalization over GDP 
FFLLSV: Financial Factor LLSV. 
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Table A6.2: Spread 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Maturity 5.55 3.76 4.73 0.54 
DC toGDP  49,14* 47,41* 37.17 3.58 
Debt rescheduled 30.16 23.43 12.14 40.4 
Inflation 0,084* 0,08** 0,08* 0.06 
Variety dummy - 23.21 22.71 27.54 
U.S. T-bill YC 0.44 -1.9 2.36 -15.99 
ED to GDP 197.34 214.12 212.64 545,12** 
GDP growth 304,8** -316,29** -295,21** -277,81** 
DS to X 1,99** 1,81* 1,99* -0.26 
RES to ST debt -30,74* -27.3 -37,6** -15.15 
Estimated amount -63.84 -52.98 -83.19 88.14 
Inv. Mills Ratio 75.85 70.24 101,9* -61.1 
PBMC - - 785,04* - 
Squared of PBMC - - -1306,88* - 
FFLLSV - - - -360,73** 
Rating residual 25,59** 26,28** 26,34** 17,9** 
10-y U.S. T-bill rate -602,72** -571,17** -594,86** -439,53** 
 International liquidity -4,06** -3,98** -3,53** -4,43** 
Liquidity growth -181.17 -141.02 -63.96 -428.61 
Latin America 147,12** 146,72** 192.7 131,65** 
East Europe 191,22* 182,79* 241,33* 91.33 
Orient  107.87 97.93 131.85 104.45 
Four AsianTigers -75.39 -71.91 -100.8 -7.24 
Before Mexico -193,76** -180,8** -184,32** -100.1 
Mexico-Asia  -56.12 -51.41 -47.53 -21.7 
New century  50.51 47.55 57.9 -1.97 
USD  50.48 53,5* 62,34* 31.47 
EUR  55.59 51.42 58.22 23.41 
Constant 2056,9** 1913,3** 1955,1** 902.76 
No. of observations 157 157 157 157 
R- squared  0.585 0.62 0.61 0.68 
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Table A7: Domestic Financial Conditions (WDI) – Factor Analysis 
Method: Unrotated principal components Factor loadings
Factor Eigenvalue Variable Factor 1
Factor 1 1 .066 Stocks traded, total value  (%  of GDP)  0.73
Factor 2 -0 .228 Stocks traded, turnover ratio (%) 0.73  
 
 
Table A8: Domestic Financial Conditions (LLSV) – Factor Analysis 
Method: Unrotated principal components Factor loadings
Factor Eigenvalue Variable Factor 1
Factor 1 1.563 Overall efficiency 3:turnover / net interest margin           0.565
Factor 2 0.437 Overall efficiency 4:turnover / overhead costs 0.565  
 
 
Table A9: Sargan Test for Over-identifying Restrictions 
Compare model  (a)  with model  (b)
Under Ho:  Model (b) is consistent and Model (a) is consistent
Under Ha:  Model (b) is inconsistent but Model (a) is consistent
(b) (a) j Prob>chi2 Result 
unreported* (2) Table 5 20 1 Accept Ho
unreported** (2) Table 6 21 1 Accept Ho
unreported** (2) Table 7 21 1 Accept Ho
unreported** (3) Table 7 21 - -
Accept Ho, under specification (a) the model is overidentified
Note: * Did not  include pensions, adults nor the two measures of international liquidity.
         ** Did not include the adults variable nor the two measures of international liquidity.  
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Table A10: Countries and Regional Dummies 
C o u n try R e g io n
C ze c h  R e p u b lic  1  (E a s t E u ro p e )
M e x ic o 2  (L a tin  A m e r ic a )
C h in a 3  (N e w  G ia n ts )
T h a ila n d 4  (  T ig e rs )
S a u d i A ra b ia 5  (O rie n t)
M o ro c c o 6  (A fr ic a )
B u lg a r ia 1
C ro a tia 1
H u n g a ry 1
L a tv ia 1
L ith u a n ia 1
P o la n d 1
S in g a p o re 4
S lo ve n ia 1
R u s s ia 1
S lo v a k  re p u b lic 1
B a h ra in 5
M a la ys ia 4
R o m a n ia 1
U k ra in e 1
E g yp t 5
S r i L a n k a 5
D o m in ic a n  R e p u b lic 2
B ra s il 2
P a k is ta n 5
L e b a n o n 5
U ru g u a y 2
A rg e n tin a 2
B o s tw a n a 6
C h ile 2
C o lo m b ia  2
C o s ta  R ic a 2
C yp ru s 1
E c u a d o r 2
E l S a lv a d o r 2
E s to n ia 1
G u a te m a la 2
In d ia 3
In d o n e s ia 4
K a z a k h s ta n 5
K o re a 4
R e p u b lic  o f  M a u r it iu s 6
M o ld o v a 1
P a n a m a 2
P e ru 2
S e rb ia 1
S o u th  A f r ic a 6
C o n g o 6
P h ilip p in e s 4
T r in id a d  y  T o b a g o 2
T u rk e y  5
V e n e zu e la 2  
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Table A11: Credit Ratings 
 
AAA 1
AA+ 2
AA 3
AA- 4
A+ 5
A 6
A- 7
BBB+ 8
BBB 9
BBB- 10
BB+ 11
BB 12
BB- 13
B+ 14
B 15
B- 16
CCC+ 17
CCC 18  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO N.º 0809 
Table A12: Data Sources 
Variables Source Frequency
    Bonds characteristics Bondware
    US T-bill 1 year. Const. maturities-middle rate (1) Datastream Quarterly 
    US T-bill 10 year. Const. maturities-middle rate (2)    Datastream Quarterly 
    Yield curve = (2) - (1) Datastream Quarterly 
    Stock market capitalization to GDP FSD (WB) Yearly
    Public bond market capitalization (% of GDP) FSD (WB) Yearly
    Stocks traded, turnover ratio (%) FSD (WB) Yearly
    External debt, total (DOD, current USD) WDI (WB) Yearly
    GDP (current USD) WDI (WB) Yearly
    Exports as a % of GDP WDI (WB) Yearly
    Imports as a % of GDP WDI (WB) Yearly
    Short-term debt (% of total external debt) WDI (WB) Yearly
    Total debt service (% exports of goods and services) WDI (WB) Yearly
    Total reserves (current USD) WDI (WB) Yearly
    Inflation WDI (WB) Yearly
    Proportion of population above 55 WDI (WB) Yearly
    Proportion of the population between 35–55 WDI (WB) Yearly
    Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP) WDI (WB) Yearly
   Stocks traded, turnover ratio (%) WDI (WB) Yearly
    Total amount of debt rescheduled (USD) GDF (WB) Yearly
    Domestic Credit (national currency, millions) IFS (IMF) Yearly
    GDP (National Currency, Millions) IFS (IMF) Yearly
    Various Exchange rates       GFD Quarterly 
   Turnover / net interest margin LLSV
   Turnover / overhead costs LLSV
    Data on pensions reform USSSA
    Data about debt agreements Paris Club
WDI: World Development Indicators
FSD: Financial Structure Database
GDF: Global Development Finance
IFS: International Financial Statistics
GFD: Global Financial Data
USSSA: US Social Security Administration
LLSV: La Porta et al. (1996)  
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Assessing the Effect of Financial Conditions on the Sovereign Debt Structure 
M M
S S
M S Z X
S M Z X
α β
γ δ
= + +Φ
= + +Φ  
 
where Z  is the variable whose effect we want to study. 
Simple manipulation of the equations above leads to the two following equations: 
 
(1 ) ( )
(1 ) ( )
M Z REST
S Z REST
αγ β αδ
αγ γβ δ
− = + +
− = + +  
 
From here it is straight forward to obtain the marginal effect of an increase in Z  on both 
variables, 
( )
(1 )
( )
(1 )
M
Z
S
Z
β αδ
αγ
γβ δ
αγ
∂ +=∂ −
∂ +=∂ −
 
 
Marginal effects 
 Spread Maturity   
Liquidity <0 >0 
Bond market development 
Low >0 <0 
High <0 >0 
Stock market development <0 >0 
LLSV – Financial Mkt. Liquidity  <0 >0 
 
Increases in the availability of funds on international markets are followed by rising maturities 
along with decreasing spreads. Increases on the liquidity of domestic financial markets raise 
the maturity of the debt, and this raises the spread. 
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